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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUDE J- NICHOLES, * 
Plaintiff/Appellant, * BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* 
JAMES LEWIS NICHOLES, * Case No- 880273-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. * Category No. 14 b 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(g)(1987). This is an appeal from a 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Third Judicial District Court, 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in setting its 
awards of alimony and child support? Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion in awarding James Nicholes, Defendant and Respon-
dent, the right to claim the minor children as dependents 
for income tax purposes? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, art. VI, §2; 26 U.S.C. §152(e)(1988); Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7(2)(1984). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Nicholes were married on June 30, 1964. Mrs. 
Nicholes was sixteen years old at the time, and received no 
educational training past high school. Record at 29. She tried 
to work in 1985, but was unable to continue because of her 
medical problems. Record at 81-84. She suffers from a number of 
ailments that prevent her from being able to work. Record at 
4-25. During most of the marriage, Mrs. Nicholes worked primar-
ily as a housewife, raising the three children. James, the 
oldest, is no longer a minor. The Decree of Divorce awarded Mrs. 
Nicholes the custody of Jason, born in 1969, and Rebekah Ann, 
born in 1974. 
Mr. Nicholes worked two jobs during most of the marriage. 
He was laid off from Kennecott for a period in 1985 and 1986, but 
then was hired back. Record at 182, 184. He has worked there for 
twenty-three years. Record at 182. He left his job of twenty 
years at Western States Masonry about the time he moved out of 
the house in November 1987, though it is unclear from the record 
whether he quit or was laid off. Record at 35, 36, 132, 178. 
Between 1982 and 1985 he was working both jobs and earned between 
$43,000.00 and $53,000.00 per year, even though he often took 
between one and two months off a year to go hunting. Record at 
37, 39. The record indicated that there were no savings because 
of his hunting trip expenses and because he was laid off from one 
of his jobs. Record at 39, 182. 
This appeal is pursuant to a divorce granted to the parties 
on March 22, 1988, which became final sixty days after entry. 
Mrs. Nicholes was awarded custody of the two children, Rebekah 
Ann, age 14, and Jason Manuel, age 18. The court awarded perma-
nent alimony of $250.00 per month, and child support of $100.00 
per child, until the children reached the age of eighteen or 
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graduated from high school, whichever came last. There was no 
provision for an increase in child support or alimony when Jason 
graduated from high school, although he graduated in June 1988, 
within one month of the Decree of Divorce becoming final on May 
20, 1988. Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on April 21, 
1988. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding only 
$100.00 per month to Mrs. Nicholes for child support and $250.00 
per month for alimony. Specifically, the trial court failed to 
make findings concerning the historical earnings of Mr. Nicholes, 
which findings were necessary to adequately consider his ability 
to earn. Further, the court abused its discretion by setting 
inadequate child support and alimony, which awards unjustly left 
Mrs. Nicholes1 household and Mr. Nicholes' household with ex-
tremely disparate standards of living. In addition, the trial 
court should have provided for an increase in alimony and child 
support to take effect upon the termination of support for one of 
the parties' children. Finally, the trial court's award to Mr. 
Nicholes of the right to claim the children as dependents for 
personal income tax purposes conflicted with the Internal Revenue 




I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
DETERMINATION OF THE ALIMONY AWARD. 
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Mrs. 
Nicholes an inadequate amount of alimony resulting in a serious 
inequity between the standard of living of the parties. The 
underlying purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving spouse 
to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a 
public charge." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986). 
11
 [T]he ultimate test of the propriety of an alimony award is 
whether, given all these factors, the party receiving alimony 
will be able to support him or herself, as nearly as possible at 
the standard of living ... enjoyed during marriage". Naranjo v. 
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The purpose 
of an alimony award is to equalize the parties1 respective 
standards of living as much as possible. Olson v. Olson, 704 
P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). 
The trial court has discretion in setting alimony, but must 
exercise that discretion within the standards set by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). The 
Supreme Court articulated the following three factors a trial 
court should consider in determining alimony: 
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife; 
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself; and 
(3) the ability of the husband to provide support. 
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English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,411-412 (Utah 1977). Failure to 
analyze the parties' circumstances using these three factors 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to analyze 
the parties1 circumstances in the Nicholes case in light of the 
English factors. The only finding that the trial court made 
regarding Mrs. Nicholes1 financial condition and needs was 
,f[t]hat the plaintiff is unemployed, and has physical problems 
that prevent her employment." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law at 2. There were no specific findings by the court regarding 
Mrs. Nicholes' needs, although evidence was presented that her 
total monthly expenses (including the needs of the minor children 
living with her) ranged between $1,984.78 to $2,134.78. Exhibit 
5 and Record at 66-67. The trial court made a finding that "the 
defendant is currently employed at Kennecott and earning, approx-
imately, $1,665.00 gross, per month." Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law at 2. The original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law submitted by counsel for Mrs. Nicholes included a recitation 
of Mr. Nicholes' historical earnings in the years 1982 through 
1986 which earnings were much greater than his earnings at the 
time the Decree of Divorce was entered. Original Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law at 2-3. The trial court ordered that 
the recitation of Mr. Nicholes' earnings in the previous years be 
deleted from the final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. 
Record at 214. The trial court improperly relied on Mr. 
Nicholes' income at the time of the Divorce Decree instead of his 
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historical earnings in determining the husband's ability to 
provide spousal support. Such reliance is contrary to the stan-
dard articulated in the English case. 
It is an abuse of discretion when the trial court's award of 
alimony is so inequitable as to result in a great disparity in 
the standards of living of the parties following a divorce. 
Canning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The Utah 
Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have reversed and/or 
remanded a number of cases when the awards of alimony were so 
inequitable that they constituted an abuse of discretion. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072; Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325; Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Following a marriage of long duration, an alimony award 
should equalize the parties' respective standards of living to 
the extent possible. Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1081. Like the 
Nicholes' case, in Rasband, the marriage was long in duration 
(thirty years) and Mrs. Rasband was severely limited in her 
ability to earn and had no income at the time of the divorce. 752 
P.2d at 1333. The Utah Court of Appeals found the disparity 
between the alimony award of $9,600.00 per year and Mr. Rasband's 
remaining income of $36,000.00 so striking as to constitute an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. "His standard of 
living will be much nearer that enjoyed during the marriage than 
will hers." Id. In Canning, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded 
the case because the record was inadequately developed concerning 
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the wife's needs and her ability to earn. 744 P.2d at 327. The 
husband had an annual income of $24,000.00, while Mrs. Canning 
received $350.00 per month in child support, no alimony, and made 
$1,200 the previous year. Id. The appellate court found that 
"David Canning's standard of living will be much closer to what 
it was during the marriage than will be appellant's". Id. 
The alimony award of $250.00 per month to Mrs. Nicholes will 
not even come close to meeting her monthly expenses of $1,985.00 
to $2,135.00. More importantly, the alimony award of $250.00 is 
unconscionable in its overwhelming disparity. This is so even 
if the court accepts the trial court's finding that Mr. Nicholes 
is able to earn only $1,665.00 per month. The alimony award has 
the effect of impoverishing Mrs. Nicholes, while Mr. Nicholes 
standard of living will be much nearer to that enjoyed during the 
marriage. An alimony award resulting in such a great disparity 
between the standards of living of the parties constitutes an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
A. The trial court's failure to consider Mr. 
Nicholes1 historical earnings constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. 
When determining alimony, the court is required to make 
specific findings concerning the ability of the obligor to earn. 
English, 565 P.2d at 412. The trial court found "that the Mr. 
Nicholes is currently employed at Kennecott and earning, approx-
imately, $1665.00, gross, per month." Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law at 2. 
When the husband has experienced a temporary decrease in 
earnings, the trial court must take into account his historical 
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earnings. Westenkow v. Westenkow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977). 
The record shows that Mr. Nicholes1 income during the last five 
years was $45,962.99 (1982), $48,500.00 (1983), $53,979.68 
(1984), $43,665.79 (1985), and $22,665.65 (1986). Record at 3-7; 
Exhibit 1. 
When the obligor has experienced a temporary decrease in 
income, it is reasonable for the court to impute the obligor's 
income based on his historical earning ability. Westenkow, 562 
P.2d at 1257. In Westenkow, the husband had quit his job to 
start his own company. The court said that "plaintiff has an 
established ability to earn $18,000.00 annually.... It would be 
reasonable for the court to infer that either plaintiff's income 
from his business would increase or he would seek other employ-
ment with an adequate remuneration reflecting his historical 
earning ability". Id. In English, the Utah Supreme Court 
overruled the trial court award of alimony because the trial 
judge considered only the husband's tax return of the previous 
year rather than his historical earnings in determining ability 
to pay. English, 565 P.2d at 412. 
The trial court must consider the obligor's ability to 
provide support as shown by his historical earnings rather than 
that shown by his current income. Olson, 704 P.2d at 566. The 
trial court failed to recognize that Mr. Nicholes had an estab-
lished ability to earn $40,000.00 to $50,000.00 per year. In 
determining Mr. Nicholes1 ability to earn, the trial court 
considered only the income tax return of 1986. Mr. Nicholes was 
temporarily laid off from one of his jobs in 1986 and was hired 
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back in or around December, 1986. Record at 182, 184. Because 
he was hired back late in 1986, Mr. Nicholes reestablished his 
ability to earn $40,000.00 to $50,000.00 per year. 
Counsel for Mrs. Nicholes incorporated past earnings into 
the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law but the court 
ordered that that information be stricken. Record at 214, 219. 
The trial court stated that it was inappropriate to consider past 
earnings because Mr. Nicholes "doesn't need to work two jobs." 
Record at 212. It also determined, without iany evidence, that 
Mr. Nicholes had to accept a lower rate of pay when he went back 
to work at Kennecott. Record at 191. Mr. Nicholes testified 
regarding his current cash flow. During his testimony, when the 
issue of work history was brought up, the judge refused to allow 
testimony of work history into evidence. Record at 167, 172. As 
a result the judge based his decision on vague findings. For 
example, the judge found that Mr. Nicholes had only a "meager 
amount of money," and that "there is just not enough to go 
around." Record at 177, 189. 
It is clear from the record that the trial court refused to 
hear evidence concerning Mr. Nicholes1 historical earnings and 
his ability to earn in the future. Both Mr. Nicholes' historical 
earnings and the timing of his departure from Western States 
Masonry make the trial court's consideration of a single year's 
tax return inadequate. The trial court lacked the proper evi-
dence to determine whether this decrease in income was temporary. 
This lack of evidence was because of the trial court's refusal to 
hear the relevant evidence. 
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The trial court's improper determination concerning Mr. 
Nicholes1 ability to earn resulted in a inappropriate disparity 
between the reported needs of Mrs. Nicholes and the actual 
alimony awarded. Mrs. Nicholes was accustomed to the high 
standard of living of $40,000.00 to $50,000.00 per year. Mrs. 
Nicholes' alimony award of $3,000.00 per year is not supported in 
the trial court's findings. The findings do not account for Mr. 
Nicholes' established ability to earn $40,000.00 to $50,000.00 
per year, or his apparent inability to maintain his spouse 
in a standard of living not unduly disproportionate to that 
enjoyed during the marriage. One of the goals of alimony is to 
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge. Paffel, 732 
P.2d at 100. However given the meager amount of alimony awarded 
and given Mrs. Nicholes' inability to work, it is very likely 
that she will become a public charge. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS DETERMINA-
TION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
The amount of child support awarded to Mrs. Nicholes was 
inadequate and constituted a manifest injustice. In determining 
the amount of child support to be awarded, Utah law directs the 
court to consider "all relevant factors" including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
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(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support 
of others. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2)(1984). 
The underlying objective of child support is to reach an 
equitable apportionment to each parent of a "reasonable and 
proper share of the child's expenses." Astorga v. Julio, 564 
P.2d 1385, 1386 (Utah 1977). One of the chief functions of child 
support is to protect the children against the adverse circum-
stances of their parent's divorce and to maintain a standard of 
living for them "not unduly disproportionate to that which they 
would have enjoyed had the marriage continued." Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court failed to properly evaluate the relevant 
factors in determining the amount of child support. The trial 
court's failure to consider all of the relevant factors in 
setting child support is an abuse of discretion. Stevens v. 
Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The trial judge 
made findings "that Mrs. Nicholes is unemployed, and has physical 
problems that prevent her employment". Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law at 2. The record indicates that Mrs. Nicholes is 40 
years old. Record at 28-29. Mr. Nicholes' age is not determin-
able from the record. Given Mrs. Nicholes' age, experience and 
disabilities, she clearly does not have the ability to support 
herself or the children. Further the trial court's findings 
concerning Mr. Nicholes' ability to earn are inadequate because 
they only addressed what he actually earned in the last year. 
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The trial court also failed to properly evaluate the chil-
dren's actual needs and the standard of living to which the 
children became accustomed to during the marriage. Evidence was 
presented at trial that the needs of Mrs. Nicholes and the 
children amounted to $1,985.00 to $2,135.00 per month. Exhibit 
5. The trial court awarded Mrs. Nicholes $100.00 per month per 
child in child support. Including the alimony award, the trial 
court awarded $450.00 per month for the support of Mrs. Nicholes 
and two children. Given the trial court's finding of Mr. 
Nicholes1 current monthly income of $1665.00, that left $1225.00 
per month for Mr. Nicholes. The great disparity between $450.00 
support a household of three and $1,225.00 to support a household 
of one is striking. In light of the fact that Mr. Nicholes has 
shown an established ability to earn $40,000.00 to $50,000.00 per 
year, the alimony and child support awards are outrageously 
inadeguate. Clearly, Mrs. Nicholes and the children were des-
tined to suffer a disproportionately lower standard of living 
from that enjoyed by Mr. Nicholes. The child support and alimony 
awards effectively impoverished Mrs. Nicholes and the children, 
while preserving a much higher standard of living for Mr. 
Nicholes. 
A. The trial court should have provided for an 
increase in child support and alimony due to 
immediate termination of support for one of 
the parties1 children. 
The trial court refused to provide for an increase in child 
support and/or alimony for Mrs. Nicholes even though support for 
the child Jason was terminating within a month of the Decree of 
Divorce becoming final. The Decree of Divorce provided for child 
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support in the amount of $100.00 per month per child "until each 
minor child attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high 
school in due course, whichever last occurs." Decree of Divorce 
at 2. The Verified Complaint for Divorce pled for $300.00 per 
month per child in child support, to be increased to $450.00 per 
month for the support of the minor child, Rebekah, after the 
child support for Jason terminated. Verified Complaint for 
Divorce at 3. The Verified Complaint further requested alimony 
in the amount of $400.00 per month to be increased to $550.00 per 
month when child support terminated for Jason. 
The trial court denied Mrs. Nicholes' request for this 
increase in alimony and child support, even though the change was 
almost immediate. Jason had already reached the age of 18 at the 
time that the Decree of Divorce was entered and had graduated 
from high school within one month of the Decree becoming final. 
Mrs. Nicholes has been further impoverished by the trial court's 
failure to account for this change that took place immediately. 
Mrs. Nicholes and the remaining minor child are living on 
$4,200.00 in child support and alimony per year. According to 
the trial court's finding of his income, Mr. Nicholes has 
$15,780.00 per year to support only himself. In light of Mr. 
Nicholes' historical earnings, Mrs. Nicholes and Rebekah have 
experienced a change in their standard of living from $40,000.00 
or $50,000.00 per year to $4,200.00 per year in the course of 
this marital dissolution. 
The trial court erred in failing to account for an immediate 
change in circumstances. Parties should not have to return to 
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court on a petition for modification for a change in circumstanc-
es that is before the court at the time of trial and is certain 
to take place immediately after the order is entered. 
Failing to take the immediate change in circumstances into 
account in the awards made the future standards of living of the 
parties unconscionably inequitable. This case therefore, in-
volves even more striking inequities than those of cases this 
court has previously overturned. It is unclear from the record 
how the trial judge arrived at his determination. Even if this 
court declines to ascertain the proper amounts to be awarded, it 
should make it clear on remand that the trial court should 
increase the amount of child support for Rebekah and alimony for 
Mrs. Nicholes based on the child support for Jason terminating 
almost immediately after the divorce decree became final. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING MR. 
NICHOLES THE RIGHT TO CLAIM THE MINOR CHILDREN AS 
DEPENDENTS FOR TAX PURPOSES. 
The trial court erred in awarding Mr. Nicholes the right to 
claim the minor children as dependents on his income tax return. 
The trial court failed to comply with the Internal Revenue Code 
because federal law has given the custodial parent the right to 
declare the minor children as dependents for income tax purposes 
since 1985. 26 U.S.C. 152(e) (1988). The 1984 revision of the 
Internal Revenue Code provides that, for federal income tax 
purposes, a child of divorced parents shall be considered as 
having received over half his support from the parent having 
custody for the greater portion of the calendar year, unless the 
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non-custodial parent can prove that his or her circumstances meet 
one of the exceptions to the general rule. 
The exceptions to the Internal Revenue Code section giving 
the custodial parent the tax exemption for the children are if 
there was a "qualified pre-1985 instrument or if the custodial 
parent voluntarily signs an agreement to give the exemptions to 
the non-custodial parent. 26 U.S.C. §152(e) (1988). The Utah 
Court of Appeals embraced the custodial parent rule from the 
Internal Revenue Code in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d at 69, 72 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). In that case the issue rested on whether a 
stipulation signed in 1983 and revoked in 1985 was a "qualified 
pre-1985 instrument". The court ruled that the custodial parent 
is entitled to the tax exemptions absent the ability of the 
non-custodial parent to establish one of the exceptions to the 
rule. Id. 
The only way that Mr. Nicholes can be given the children's 
tax exemptions, pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, is if Mrs. 
Nicholes signs a written declaration giving him the exemptions. 
It is Mrs. Nicholes' position that the Internal Revenue Code 
contemplates a voluntarily written declaration by the custodial 
parent. Further, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to order the custodial parent to involuntarily execute the 
written declaration. 
Because there is no exception to the general rule in this 
case, Mrs. Nicholes is clearly entitled to the right to the 
children's tax exemptions as the custodial parent. The trial 
court's decision violates the Supremacy Clause of the United 
- 15 -
States Constitution, and thus constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
This court should reverse the trial court's decision and award 
Mrs. Nicholes the right to claim the minor children as dependents 
for income tax purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in its determination 
of the alimony and child support awards. The trial court's 
findings on the factors to be considered for both alimony and 
child support were inadequate to support the court's awards. The 
trial court further abused its discretion by failing to consider 
the historical earnings of Mr. Nicholes in setting the alimony 
and child support awards. The trial court's award of alimony was 
so low that it resulted in a great disparity in the standards of 
living of the parties following the divorce. The child support 
awards for the minor children were so inadequate as to result in 
impoverishing the children by clearly failing to meet their 
needs. The trial court further erred by refusing to provide for 
an increased amount of child support and alimony when the child 
support for one child was terminating immediately after the 
Divorce Decree became final. Finally, the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding Mr. Nicholes the right to claim the minor 
children as dependents for tax purposes in violation of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
The trial court's awards of alimony and child support should 
be reversed, and this court should enter awards that are adequate 
for the support of Mrs. Nicholes and the children. Alternatively, 
- 16 -
the case should be remanded for further findings and awards in 
conformity with federal and state law. 
DATED this 0 day of , 1988, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for priaifiktiff/Appellant 
k& yt£^ 
BY: LOUISA L. BAKER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
3£ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of August, 1988, I 
mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to F. Kim Walpole, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
(llb/nichole4.bri) 
n _ 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attoroev <for P l a in t i f f 
CCRPCRCN & WILLIAMS 
Sui te 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JUDE NICKCLES, 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE AND 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR ORDER TO SKCW CAUSE 
-vs- Civil No. 
JAKES LEWIS NICHOLES, Judge 
Defendant. 
CCMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF to the above-en titled action, by and through 
counsel, and complains and alleges against the defendant as follows: 
1. RESIDENCE Plaintiff is and has been a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah for a period of three months or more immediately prior to the 
filing of the Ccmplaint in this action. 
2. MARRIAGE. The parties to this action are husband and wife, having 
been married on June 30, 1964 in Magna, Utah. 
3. GROUNDS, The defendant has indicated by words and actions that the 
legitimate ends of the marriage are no longer being pursued, and that the 
parties1 differences have caused the irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage. 
These words and actions on the part of the defendant have caused the plaintiff 
great mental and emotional distress and suffering, making.continuation of-the. ...: 
marriage impossible. 
ADDENDUM 1-1 
4. CUSTODY. There are two children bom as issue of this marriage in 
need of support, namely, Rebekah A m , bom April 30, 1974, and Jascn Emanuel, 
bom Decenber 15, 1969. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded 
the temporary and permanent care, custody and control of said minor children. 
5. VISITATION. Defendant should be awarded liberal and reasonable 
visitation with the minor children,. 
6. HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE. Defendant should be ordered to 
maintain in force, tsnporarily and permanently, health and accident and dental 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties, when it is 
available through his employment, until the miner children attain the age of 
18 years or graduate from high school, whichever last occurs. Further, the 
defendant should be ordered to maintain, on a temporary and permanent basis, 
health and accident and dental insurance for the benefit of the plaintiff. 
Further, the defendant should be ordered to pay all medical, dental and 
optical expenses not covered by the insurance until the minor children attain 
the age of 18 years or graduate from high school, whichever last occurs. 
Further, the defendant should be ordered to pay for the dental work currently 
needing to be accomplished on the plaintiff. 
7. LIFE INSURANCE. Defendant should be ordered to maintain in force a 
policy of insurance on his own life, naming the minor children as the primary 
beneficiaries of said life insurance policy, in the minimum face value of 
$80,000.00, until each child reaches che age of 18 years or graduates from 
high school, whichever last occurs. Once the minor children have attained the 
age of 18 years or graduated from high school, the defendant should be 
required to maintain in force an insurance policy on his own life, in the 
minimun face value of $50,000.00, naming the plaintiff as the primary 
beneficiary of said policy. 
ADDENDUM 1-2 
8. GULP SUPPORT. Defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff the 
sun of $300.00 per month, per child, as and for child support, for the support 
and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, until the minor child, 
Jason Bnanuel, attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, 
whichever last occurs, at which time the defendant should pay to plaintiff the 
sum or $450.00 per month, as and for the support and maintenance of the minor 
child, Rebekah Ann. Said support shall continue until the minor child, 
Rebekah Ann, attains the age of 18 years or graduates frcm high school, 
whichever last occurs. Further, it is reasonable that said support payments 
be made on or before the 5th day of each month. 
If the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears in his child support 
obligation, the plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory income withholding 
relief, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45(d)-1 , ez. see (1984, 
as amended). 
9. ALIMONY. The defendant is able-bodied and employed and the plaintiff 
is in need of support to maintain herself, and defendant should be ordered to 
pay to plaintiff the sum of $400.00 per month, until the eldest child attains 
the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, whichever last occurs, and 
the obligation of supporting that child on the part of the defendant ceases, 
at which time the alimony should increase to the sum of $550.00 per month, 
until such time as the minor child, Rebekah Ann, attains the age of 18 years 
or graduates from high school, and the obligation on the part of the defendant 
to pay support for said child ceases, at which time the alimony should be 
increased to the sum of $800.00 per month. Said alimony should continue until 
the death of the plaintiff or the death of the defendant. 
10. PERSONAL PROPERTY. During the course of their marriage, the parties 
ADDENDUM 1-3 
have acquired certain i tsns of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and 
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belongings, and household furnishings, fixtures and appliances, which items 
have been previously divided by the parties, and this division should be 
confirmed in each, with each parry being awarded those items currently in his 
or her possession. 
11 • VEHICLES. During the course of their marriage, the parties have 
acquired certain automobiles, including a 3/4 ton Ford truck, an Oldsmobile 
Ciera, a 1957 Jeep and a 1979 Ford 1/2 ton four-wheel drive truck. Plaintiff 
should be awarded the Oldsmcbile Ciera and the Jeep, free and clear of any 
interest of the defendant. Defendant should be awarded the 3/4 ten Ford 
truck, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. Further, the 1979 
Ford truck should be awarded to the parties1 son, Jason Emanuel. 
During the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired four 
snowmobiles, a horse trailer and an 8-foot cab-over camper. Plaintiff should 
be awarded the camper and the defendant should be awarded all of the 
snowmobiles and the horse trailer. 
12, RETIRBMENT, PENSIONS AND MARITAL FUNDS. During the course of their 
marriage, the parties have acquired an interest in a pension at Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, and were paid the sum of approximately $33,000.00, 
representing a pension in Western States Masonry. The plaintiff should be 
awarded one-half of the pension received from Western States Masonry, either 
in cash or as on offset en the defendant's equity in the real property. 
Further, the plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the defendant's pension 
at Kennecott Copper, as of the date of divorce of the parties. 
All other marital funds, accounts and monies should be divided equally 
between the parties, one-half to each. 
13. REAL PROPERTY. During the course of their marriage, the parties 
ADDENDUM IT4 
have acquired an interest in real property ccrnEcnly known as 3260 South 7900 
West in Magna, Utah. Plaintiff should be awarded the temporary and permanent 
use and possession of said real property, and all right, title and interest 
therein, including any reserve accounts, subject to a lien in behalf of the 
defendant in the sum of one-half of a fair and reasonable equity in said real 
property, which should become par/able to defendant upon the first to occur of 
the following events: 
a. plaintiff1 s remarriage or cohabitation in the heme with a man 
other than the defendant; 
b. the youngest minor child of the parties achieving the age or is 
years or graduating from high school, whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
d. the sale of the real property at plaintiff's election; 
e. plaintiff's failure to utilize said real property as her primary 
place of residence. 
Defendant should be required to pay for the costs of an appraisal on said real 
property and said appraisal should be used in computing the equity and lien of 
the defendant. 
14. DEBTS. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
incurred certain debts and obligations, which include debts to Peter Nelson 
and Chase Manhattan. Defendant should be ordered to pay and assume, 
tenporarily and permanently, all debts and obligations incurred by the parties 
during the course of their marriage. 
15. ATTORNEY'S FEES. The plaintiff is without sufficient funds to 
support herself and pay her attorney's fees. Defendant should be ordered to 
pay plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in bringing..this action. 
16. EXECUTION. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary, documents to transfer the title and ownership of the property of the 
parties pursuant to the Decree entered in this action. 
17* TEMPORARY RELIEF. The defendant has previously been verbally and 
emotionally abusive of the plaintiff and irreparable harm and damage will 
occur to her if a restraining order is not entered, and it is reasonable, 
necessary and proper that defendant be restrained from physically or verbally 
harassing the plaintiff, or coming around the plaintiff at the marital 
residence, unless invitee for the purposes of schedules visitation with the 
minor children. 
The plaintiff is in need of temporary possession of the real property of 
the parties for herself and the minor children so that they can remain in the 
neighborhood and their school. Further, the plaintiff is able to find minimum 
employment, and has been unenployed, except for a matter of weeks, during the 
entire course of the marriage, and it is reasonable, necessary and proper that 
she be awarded tenporary alimony and temporary child support in the sum of 
$1 ,000.00 per month, and that the defendant be ordered to pay all marital 
debts and obligations incurred by the parties during the marriage, on a 
tenporary basis. Further, it is reasonable that the plaintiff be awarded the 
temporary care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties, in 
that the plaintiff has always been the primary caretaker of the children, and 
that their best interests would be served by an order of temporary custody in 
the plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. For a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing 
between the parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
the signing and entry thereof by the court. 
2. For said Decree to be granted in accordance with the Complaint of the 
plaintiff, as set forth above. 
3« That an Order to Shew Cause be entered requiring the defendant to be 
and appear before the above-en titled court to show cause, if any he may have, 
as follows: 
a. Why the plaintiff should not be awarded the tenporary custody ot 
the minor children of the parties; 
b. Why the defendant should not be temporarily and permanently 
restrained from verbally or physically harassing the plaintiff, or from coming 
onto the real property except for purposes of scheduled visitation with the 
minor children of the parties; 
c. Why plaintiff should not be awarded the temporary use and 
possession of the real property of the parties; 
d. Why the defendant should not be ordered to pay to plaintiff 
temporary alimony and temporary child support in the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month; 
e. Why the defendant should not be ordered to pay and assume the 
marital debts and obligations of the parties, on a temporary basis; 
4. For such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and 
proper. 
DAZED IHIS £ ^ ^ 1 of j S i A J ^ ^ A ^ ^ 1987 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
: SS , 
) 
JUDE NICHOLES, being f i r s t duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: She is the p la in t i f f to the above- en t i t led action, she has read the 
foregoing Complaint for Divorce, and understands the contents thereof and the 
same is true of her own personal knowledge• 
DATED THIS _ / day of ' — ^ ? 7 / UClAU/' 1987. 
JE-kcHOLS^O jun 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before ase this 
1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing ac Salt Lake County 
My ccnmission expires: 
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JUDE NICHOLES, 
FINDINGS OF &£± AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS/OF LAW 
-vs- Civil UzT# D87-89 
JAMES LEWIS NICHOLES, Judge Kenneth Rigtru? 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for t r i a l on August 
14, 1987, a t the hour of I O I O ^ O 1 clock a.m., and the t r i a l not being completed 
a t tha t time, and having been r e s e t for t r i a l and heard on October 6th and 
7th , 1987 a t the bour^ of 1:30 and 2:00 p^m., the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
Judge pres iding, and :he p l a i n t i f f having appeared in person and with counsel, 
Ke l l i e F. Williams, and the defendant having appeared in person and with 
counsel , F. £im Walpole, and the Court having heard the testimony of the 
p a r t i e s grid t h e i r wi tnesses , and having reviewed the f i l e and having 
interviewea the minor chi ldren of the pa r t i e s in chambers, and having heard 
the ' argument of counsel, more than 90 days having elapsed since the f i l ing of 
the Complaint in th i s ac t ion , the Court, being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following: 
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1. That the plaintiff is and has been a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for a period of three months or more prior to the filing of 
this action. 
2. That the plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been 
married on June 30, 1964 in Magna, Utah. 
3* That the acts of the defendant in removing himself from the marital 
residence and refusing to return and remain married to -the plaintiff caused 
the plaintiff great mental and eaotional distress and suffering, making 
continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. That there have been three children bom alive as issue of this 
marriage, two of whom are in need of support, namely, Rebekah Ann, bom April 
30, 1974 and Jason Emanuel, bom December 15, 1969• The plaintiff is a fit 
and proper person to be awarded the permanent care, custody and control of 
said minor children. The minor child Rebekah, expressed to the Court a desire 
to reside with her mother, and the minor child Jason, indicated a desire to be 
in his mother's custody. 
5. That the defendant should be awarded reasonable visitation with the 
minor children as is convenient and appropriate between the minor children and 
the defendant. 
6. That the plaintiff is unemployed, and has physical problems that 
prevent her employment, and the defendant is employed at Kennecott and 
earning, approximately, $1 ,665.00 per month. 
7. The court finds that previous to 1987, the defendant was employed in 
two occupations, and that the parties' gross wages were, in 1982 - $45,962.99; 
in 1983 - $48,500.00; in 1984 - $53,979.68; in 1985 -"$43,665.79; and, in 
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1986 - $22,655.65. The court does not believe that the defendant is required 
to remain employed in two jobs in order to support the parties or their 
children in their lifestyle previously held and, specifically, finds that the 
defendant is not purposely not seeking employment for the purpose of avoiding 
obligations. 
8« That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant pay to 
the plaintiff, as and for child support, the sum of One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00) per month, per child, for a total of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) 
per month, until each minor child attains the age of 18 years or graduates 
from high school in due course, whichever last occurs. Said support should be 
payable one-half on the 10th, and one-half on the 25th of each month. Should 
the minor child, Jason, be residing other than in the plaintiff's home, then 
the plaintiff should be responsible for paying that support to the individual 
who is providing for the minor child, Jason. 
9. That it • is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant 
maintain in force his health and accident insurance, and such insurance as may 
be available through his employment, and that he continue to maintain the 
children as beneficiaries under said insurance policy as long as he is able to 
qualify said children under his medical/dental plan. Further, it is 
reasonable that the defendant maintain in force all health, accident and 
dental insurance for the benefit of the plaintiff until the divorce is final. 
Further, it is reasonable that each party pay one-half of all medical, dental, 
optical or orthodontic expenses that are not covered by said insurance. 
10. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant 
maintain, for the benefit of the minor children, the insurance policy on his 
life available through his union and through Kennecott and that he name the 
3 
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minor children as the beneficiaries of said life insurance policy and that the 
plaintiff be named as the trustee of said funds. 
11 • That if the defendant falls thirty (30) or more days in arrears in 
his child support obligation, the plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory 
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45(d)-1 , 
j2t. ^ sea., (1984 as amended). 
12. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, as 
and for alimony. Said alimony should continue until the death of the 
plaintiff, the death of the defendant, or the plaintiff's remarriage or 
cohabitation. 
13. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that each party be 
ordered to provide the other party with a signed copy of their tax return, on 
or before April 30th of each year, and keep the other apprised of their 
employment situations. 
14. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant be 
awarded the right to claim the minor children as dependents for purposes of 
the calculation of the state and federal income tax dependent deductions, as 
long as he is current in his child support obligations at the end of each tax 
year. The plaintiff should be ordered to sign any necessary waiver permitting 
said exemption. Should the plaintiff earn in excess of $7,500.00, per year, 
then she should be awarded the right to claim the minor child Rebekah Ann, as 
a dependent for purposes of the calculation of her federal and state tax 
dependent deductions. 
15. That the parties should be ordered to file a joint federal and state 
return for the year 1987. All refunds resulting from said return should be 
4 
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applied to outstanding medical expenses owing to Dr. Peter Neilsen, Dr. 
Sinnions, A. Paige Palmer, Dr. Cannon and/or Allied Labs. The defendant should 
be responsible if there are any amounts found due and owing to the Internal 
Revenue Service or the State of Utah. 
16. That during the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired 
certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, which 
have previously been divided, and which division should be confirmed in each. 
Each party should be awarded those items in his or her own possession, except 
for the following: 
a. The plaintiff should be awarded the balance of the IRA funds 
currently in possession of defendantfs counsel, to apply to her attorney's 
fees and court costs. Further, she should be awarded two of the snowmobiles 
currently in possession of the defendant; 
b. The defendant should be awarded the following property as it is 
currently in plaintiff's possession: 8-foot camper, horse trailer, coin 
collection, mirror, antique barber accessories, Avon limited edition bottles, 
sofa rocker, hide-a-bed, gin cabinet, one freezer, oak desk, adding machine, 
ten-man tent, three-man tent, propane lantern, gas camping stove, sleeping 
bag, miscellaneous camping gear, family pictures (his family), one telephone, 
220 cord, Lincoln welder, air compressor, Homelight chain saw, all but one 
ladder, wheelbarrows, scaffolding/planks, mechanic's tools and tool boxes 
(except for a variety of small hand tools to be left for plaintiff), angle 
grinder, disk sander, belt sander, bench vice, battery charger, cement tools, 
masonry handtools, any saddles or packs or blankets not associated with either 
of the children's horses; and 19" television set; 
c. Each party should keep the VCR and equipment in their 
5 
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possession; 
d# That the parties1 married son should be awarded the snowmobile 
trailer; 
e. That it is reasonable that the minor child, Jason, should be 
awarded all of his personal property, as well as the Atari game and tapes, and 
his horse, and all related tack and equipment; 
f. That it is reasonable that the minor child, Rebekah, should be 
awarded all of her personal property and belongings, her personal computer, 
her horse, and all related tack and equipment. 
17. Each party should be awarded one-half of any other marital accounts 
or stocks, 
18. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the plaintiff 
should be awarded the Oldsmobile vehicle, and the defendant should be awarded 
the 3/4-ton pickup truck. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
all necessary documents to transfer, the title to said property. Further, the 
minor child, Jason, should be awarded his 1977 Ford pick-up truck, and the 
minor child, Rebekah, should be awarded the 1958 Jeep, which title should be 
held in the name of the plaintiff until Rebekah is of age. 
19. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the minor child, 
Rebekah, should be awarded all of her share accounts and savings accounts and 
that the minor child, Jason, should be awarded all of his share accounts and 
savings accounts. 
20. That during the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired 
an interest in real property commonly known as 3260 South 7900 West in Magna, 
Utah. It is reasonable, necessary and proper that the plaintiff should be 
awarded the possession of said real property until such time as the minor 
6 
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child, Rebekah, attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, 
whichever last occurs, or until such time as plaintiff can sell said real 
property at a price that she desires. Further, it is reasonable that she 
should pay and assume the debt and obligation owing thereon to Chase Manhattan 
Bank, commencing October 1987. However, the court further found that the 
plaintiff removed herself from the residence, and that the defendant has been 
making any necessary minimal payments on the obligation owing to Chase 
Manhattan, prior to the sale of the home, which home has had an earnest money 
offer made and which sale is pending. 
Upon the sale of said home, the proceeds from the sale should be divided 
as follows: 
a. All costs of sale and commissions should be paid; 
b. The debt owed to Chase Manhattan should be paid; 
c. All outstanding medical bills incurred by the parties up until 
the date of the divorce of the parties should be paid; 
d. Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) should be paid to 
the plaintiff for attorney's fees and costs of litigation; 
e. One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) should be paid to the defendant 
for attorney's fees and costs of litigation; and 
f. Any real property taxes owing on the real property should be 
paid; 
g. Defendant should be paid any amount that he paid to Chase 
Manhattan Bank after October 1, 1987, in order to prevent the foreclosure on 
the home and should be paid any sums expended to bring the homeowner1 s 
insurance current; 
h. The balance should be divided equally between the parties, 
7 
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one-half to each, 
21 • That during the course of their marriage, the parties have incurred 
certain debts and obligations, which include the medical debts owed to Dr. 
Simmons, Dr. Nielsen, A. Paige Palmer, Dr. Cannon and Allied Laboratories. 
Said debts should be paid as previously set forth. Further, the plaintiff 
should pay the debt to Chase Manhattan, as set forth above, until the sale of 
the home. Each party should pay and assume any debts and obligations incurred 
in his or her own name since the date of separation of the parties, said date 
being November 21 , 1986, except as set forth above . 
22. That during the marriage the parties have acquired an interest in a 
Kennecott retirement plan and a Salt Lake City Laborer's Union retirement 
plan, as well as a possible interest in a retirement at Western States 
Masonry. Plaintiff should be awarded fifty percent (50%) of all accrued 
benefits through June 30, 1987, which is defined as 23 years of service. 
Appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Orders should issue assigning said 
benefits. 
The plaintiff should be awarded all benefits available to her under the 
United States Social Security Act as a wife of the defendant in excess of 23 
years. 
23. That each party should be ordered to pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and court costs, except as set forth above. 
24. That both parties should be mutually restrained from bothering or 
harassing the other party, either physically or verbally, or coming around the 
home or place of employment of the other party for any reason whatsoever, 
except for purposes of previously arranged visitation. 
25. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the divorce of the 
8 
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parties become final 90 days from the date of entry of the Decree, 
FRCM THE FOREGOING, Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action 
and over the parties to this action. 
2. That the plaintiff and defendant are entitled to a Decree of Divorce, 
the same to become final and effective 90 days after being signed by the Judge 
and entered by the Clerk in the register of actions. 
3. That a Decree of Divorce should be granted in conformance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED THIS day of , 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form and content: 
F. KIM WALPOLE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon & 
Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein; that I caused the foregoing 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be served upon defendant 
by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
F. KIM WALPOLE 
Attorney for Defendant 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
and depositing the same, sealed, with f irst-class postage pre-paid thereon, in 
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for P la in t i f f 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Sui te 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CCURT, 
m AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JUDE NICHOLES, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Pla in t i f f , CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
- v s - Civil No. D87-89 
J&iES LEWIS NICHOLES, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTICNED MATTER having come en regularly for trial on August 
14, 1987, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m., and the trial not being completed 
at that time, and having been reset for trial and heard on October 6th and 
7th, 1987 at the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 p.m., the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
Judge presiding, and the plaintiff having appeared in person and with counsel, 
Kellie F. Williams, and the defendant having appeared in person and with 
counsel, F. Kim Walpole, and the Court having heard the testimony of the 
parties and their witnesses, and having reviewed the file and having 
interviewed the minor children of the parties in chambers, and having heard 
the argument of counsel, more than 90 days having elapsed since the filing of 
the Complaint in this action, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following: 
TvnrkTPTanTTM *3_i 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Than the piainciff is ar.d has been a resident of Sale Lake County, 
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State of Utah, for a period of three months or more prior to the filing of 
this action, 
2. That the plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been 
married on June 20, 1964 in Jiagna, Utah, 
3. That the acts of the defendant in removing himself from the marital 
residence and refusing to return and remain married to the plaintiff caused 
tie plaintiff great mental and emotional distress and suffering, making 
continuation of the marriage impossible. 
4. That there have been three children born alive as issue of this 
marriage, two of whom are in need of support, namely, Rebekah Ann, born April 
30, 1974 and jascn Emanuel, born December 15, 1969. The plaintiff is a fit 
and proper person to be awarded the permanent care, custody and control of 
said minor children. The minor child Rebekah, expressed to the Court a desire 
to reside with her mother, and the minor child Jascn, indicated a desire to be 
in his mother's custody. 
5. That the defendant should be awarded reasonable visitation with the 
minor children as is convenient and appropriate between the minor children and 
the defendant. 
6. That the plaintiff is unemployed, and has physical problems that 
prevent her employment, and the defendant is currently employed at Kennecott 
and earning, approximately, $1,665.00, gross, per month. 
7. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant pay to 
the plaintiff, as and for child support, the sum of One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00) per month, per child, for a total of Ttoo Hundred Dollars ($200.00) 
2 
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per month, until each minor child attains the age of .18 years or graduates 
from high school in due course, whichever last occurs. Said support should be 
payable one-half on the 10th, and one-half on the 25th of each month. Should 
the minor child, Jason, be residing other than in the plaintiff's home, then 
the plaintiff should be responsible for paying that support to Che individual 
who is providing for the minor child, Jason. 
8. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant 
maintain in force his health and accident insurance, and such insurance as may 
be available through his employment, and that he continue to maintain the 
children as beneficiaries under said insurance policy as long as he is able to 
qualify said children under his medical/dental plan. Further, it is 
reasonable that the defendant maintain in force all health, accident and 
dental insurance for the benefit of the plaintiff until the divorce is final. 
Further, it is reasonable that each party pay one-half of all medical, dental, 
optical or orthodontic expenses that are not covered by said insurance. 
9. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant 
maintain, for the benefit of the minor children, the insurance policy on his 
life available through his union and through Kennecott and that he name the 
minor children as the beneficiaries of said life insurance policy and that the 
plaintiff be named as the trustee of said funds. 
10. That if the defendant falls thirty (30) or more days in arrears in 
his child support obligation, the plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory 
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45(d)-1, 
et. seq., (1984 as amended). 
11. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, as 
3 
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and for alimony. Said alimony should continue until the death of the 
plaintiff, the death of the defencant, or the plaintiff's remarriage or 
cohabitation. 
12. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that each party be 
ordered to provide the other party with a signed copy of their tax return, on 
or before April 30th of each year, and keep the other apprised of their 
employment situations. 
13. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the defendant be 
awarded the right to claim the minor children as dependents for purposes of 
the calculation of the state and federal income tax dependent deductions, as 
long as he is current in his child support obligations at the end of each tax 
year. The plaintiff should be ordered to sign any necessary waiver permitting 
said exemption. Should the plaintiff earn in excess of $7,500.00, per year, 
then she should be ax^rded the right to claim the minor child Rebekah Ann, as 
a dependent for purposes of the calculation of her federal and state tax 
dependent deductions. 
14. That the parties should be ordered to file a joint federal and state 
return for the year 1987. All refunds resulting from said return should be 
applied to outstanding medical expenses owing to Dr. Peter Neilsen, Dr. 
Simmons, A. Paige Palmer, Dr. Cannon and/or Allied Labs. The defendant should 
be responsible if there are any amounts found due and owing to the Internal 
Revenue Service or the State of Utah. 
15. That during the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired 
certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, which 
have previously been divided, and which division should be confirmed in each. 
Each party should be awarded those items in his or her own possession, except 
4 
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for the following: 
a. The plaintiff should be awarded the balance of the IRA funds 
currently in possession of defendant's counsel, to apply to her attorney's 
fees and court costs. Further, she should be awarded two of the snowmobiles 
currently in possession of the defendant; 
b. The defendant should be awarded the following property as it is 
currently in plaintiff's possession: 8-foot camper, horse trailer, coin 
collection, mirror, antique barber accessories, Avon limited edition bottles, 
sofa rocker, hide-a-bed, gun cabinet, one freezer, oak desk, adding machine, 
ten-man tent, three-man tent, propane lantern, gas camping stove, sleeping 
bag, miscellaneous camping gear, family pictures (his family), one telephone, 
220 cord, Lincoln welder, air compressor, Homelight chain saw, all but one 
ladder, wheelbarrows, s affolding/planks, mechanic's tools and tool boxes 
(except for a variety of small hand tools to be left for plaintiff) , angle 
grinder, disk sander, belt sander, bench vice, battery charger, cement tools, 
masonry handtools, any saddles or packs or blankets not associated with either 
of the children's horses; and 19" television set; 
c. Each party should keep the VCR and equipment in their 
possession; 
d. That the parties' married son should be awarded the snowmobile 
trailer; 
e. That it is reasonable that the minor child, Jason, should be 
awarded all of his personal property, as well as the Atari game and tapes, and 
his horse, and all related tack and equipment; 
f. That it is reasonable that the minor child, Rebekah, should be 
awarded all of her personal property and belongings, her personal computer, 
5 
ADDENDUM 3-5 
her horse, and all related tack and equipment. 
16. Each party should be awarded one-half of any other marital accounts 
or stocks. 
17. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the plaintiff 
should be awarded the Oldsmobile vehicle, and the defendant should be awarded 
the 3/4-ton pickup truck. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
all necessar]/ documents to transfer the title to said property. Further, the 
minor child, Jason, should be awarded his 1977 Ford pick-up truck, and the 
minor child, Rebekah, should be awarded the 1958 Jeep, which title should be 
held in the name of the plaintiff until Rebekah is of age. 
18. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the minor child, 
Rebekah, should be awarded all of her share accounts and savings accounts and 
that the minor child, Jason, should be awarded all of his share accounts and 
savings accounts. 
19. That during the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired 
an interest in real property commonly known as 3260 South .7900 West in Magna, 
Utah. It is reasonable, necessary and proper that the plaintiff should be 
awarded the possession of said real property until such time as the minor 
child, Rebekah, attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, 
whichever last occurs, or until such time as plaintiff can sell said real 
property at a price that she desires. Further, it is reasonable that she 
should pay and assume the debt and obligation owing thereon to Chase Manhattan 
Bank, commencing October 1987. However, the court further found that the 
plaintiff removed herself from the residence, and that the defendant has been 
making any necessary minimal payments on the obligation owing to Chase 
Manhattan, prior to the sale, of the home, which home has had an earnest money 
6 
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offer made and which sale is pending. 
Upon the sale of said home, the proceeds from the sale should be divided 
as follows: 
a. All costs of sale and commissions should be paid; 
b. The debt owed to Chase Manhattan should be paid; 
c. All outstanding medical bills incurred by the parties up until 
the date of the divorce of the parties should be paid; 
d. Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) should be paid to 
the plaintiff for attorney's fees and costs of litigation; 
e. One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) should be paid to the defendant 
for attorney's fees and costs of litigation; and 
f. Any real property taxes owing on the real property should be 
paid; 
g. Defendant should be paid any amount that he paid to Chase 
Manhattan Bank after October 1, 1987, in order to prevent the foreclosure on 
the home and should be paid any sums expended to bring the homeowner's 
insurance current; 
h. The balance should be divided equally between the parties, 
one-half to each. 
20. That during the course of their marriage, the parties have incurred 
certain debts and obligations, .which include the medical debts owed to Dr. 
Simmons, Dr. Nielsen, A. Paige Palmer, Dr. Cannon and Allied laboratories. 
Said debts should be paid as previously set forth. Further, the plaintiff 
should pay the debt to Chase Manhattan, as set forth above, until the sale of 
the home. Each party should pay and assume any debts and obligations incurred 
in his or her own name since the date of separation of the parties, said date 
7 
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being November 21, 1986, except as set forth above. 
21. That during the marriage the parties have acquired an interest in a 
Kennecott retirement plan and a Salt Lake City Laborer's Union retirement 
plan, as well as a possible interest in a retirement at Western States 
Masonry. Plaintiff should be awarded fifty percent (50%) of all accrued 
benefits through June 30, 1987, which is defined as 23 years of service. 
Appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Orders should issue assigning said 
benefits. 
The plaintiff should be awarded all benefits available to her under the 
United States Social Security Act as a wife of the defendant in excess of 23 
years. 
22. That each party should be ordered to pay his or her own attorney's 
fees and court costs, except as set forth above. 
23. That both parties should be mutually restrained from bothering or 
harassing the other party, either physically or verbally, or coming around the 
home or place of employment of the other party for any reason whatsoever, 
except for purposes of previously arranged visitation. 
24. That it is reasonable, necessary and proper that the divorce of the 
parties become final 60 days from the date of entry of the Decree. 
FROM THE FOREGOING, Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action 
and over the parties to this action. 
2. That the plaintiff and defendant are entitled to a Decree of Divorce, 
the same to become final and effective 6 0 days after being signed by the Judge 
8 
snd entered by the Clerk in the register of actions. 
3. That a Decree of Divorce should be granted in conformance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
J? 
E&IED THIS ZZrnday of March, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
Appioved as to form and content: 
1 P L MagftflPo. 
F. KIM WALPOLE 
Attorney for Defendant 
RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
r* I i L w 
By 
H. DIXON H'NCLEY 
CLERKy 
Ann^MnnM -?_a 
KELLIE F„ WILLIAMS #3493 
Attorney for P la in t i f f -•-- 9 <- --
CORPORCN & WILLIAMS '" ' ~ ' K 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building . /* 
#9 Exchange Place " 0jtfL^ u^J^ 
Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FDR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
5Tc2/3 fa. W77 
Plaintiff, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
JUDE NICHOLES, 
S.-J. 
-vs- Civil No. D87-89 
JAMES LEVIS NICHOLES, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
THE AJBQVE-CAPTICfcTD MATTER having come on regularly for trial on August 
14, 1987, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m., and the trial not being completed 
at that time, and having been reset for trial and heard on October 6th and 
7th, 1987 at the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock p.m., the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, Judge presiding, and the plaintiff having appeared in person and with 
counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the defendant having appeared in person and 
with counsel, F. Kim Walpole, and the Court having heard the testimony of the 
parties and their witnesses, and having reviewed the file and having 
interviewed the minor children of the parties in chambers, and having heard 
the argument of counsel, more than 90 days having elapsed since the filing of 
the Ccoiplaint in this action, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, 
and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now, therefor; 
ADDENDUM 4-1 
IT IS KERE3Y ORDERED, AHJTJDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the bends 
of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, the same to become final 
and effective -9S days afcer being signed by the judge and entered by the clerk 
in the register of actions, 
2« Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody and control 
of the two minor children of the parties, Rebekah Ann and Jason Emanuel, 
subject to reasonable visitation in the defendant with the minor children, as 
is convenient and appropriate between the minor children and the defendant. 
3. Derendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, as and for child 
support, the sun of Cne Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month, per child, for a 
total of TWo Hundrec Dollars (S200.00) per month, until each minor child 
attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs. Said support shall be payable one-half on the 10th, 
and one-half on the 25th of each month. Should the minor child, Jason, be 
residing other than in the plaintiff's home, then the plaintiff shall be 
responsible for paying that support to the individual who is providing for the 
minor child, Jason. 
4. Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain in force his health and 
accident insurance, and such insurance as may be available through his 
employment, ana that he continue to maintain the children as beneficiaries 
under said insurance policy as long as be is able to qualify said children 
under his medical/dental plan. Defendant is further ordered to maintain in 
force all health, accident and dental insurance for the benefit of the 
plaintiff until the divorce is final. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of 
all medical, dental, optical or orthodontic expenses of the children that are 
not covered by said insurance. 
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5. < Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain in force, for the benefit of 
the minor children, the insurance policy on his life available through his 
union and through Kennecott, naming the minor children as the beneficiaries of 
said life insurance policy and naming plaintiff as the trustee of said funds* 
6. If the defendant falls thirty (30) or more days in arrears in his 
child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income 
withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45(d)-l, et. 
_seo., (1984 as amended). 
7. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, as and for alimony, until the death 
of the plaintiff, the death of the defendant, or the plaintiff's remarriage or 
cohabitation. 
8. Each party is hereby ordered to provide the other party with a signed 
copy of their tax return, on or before April 30th of each year, and keep the 
other apprised of their employment situations. 
9. Defendant is hereby awarded the right to claim the minor children as 
dependents for purposes of the calculation of his state and federal income tax 
dependent deductions, as long as he is current in his child support 
obligations at the end of each tax year and plaintiff is hereby ordered to 
execute the necessary waivers. Should the plaintiff earn in excess of 
$7,500.00, per year, then she shall be awarded the right to claim the minor 
child, Rebekah Ann, as a dependent for purposes of the calculation of her 
federal and state tax dependent deductions. 
10. The parties are hereby ordered to file joint federal and state 
returns for the year 1987. It is further ordered that all refunds resulting 
from said return shall be applied to outstanding medical expenses owing to Dr. 
Peter Neilsen, Dr. Simsxns, A. Paige Palmer, Dr. Cannon and/or Allied Labs. 
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The defendant is ordered to pay and assume any amounts found due and owing to 
the Internal Revenue Service or the State of Utah. 
11 • The parties1 previous division of their items of personal effects, 
jewelry, clothing and belongings is hereby confirmed in each and each party is 
hereby awarded those items in his or her own possession, except for the 
following: 
a. The plaintiff is hereby awarded the balance of the IRA funds 
currently in possession of defendant's counsel, to apply to her attorney1s 
fees and court coses. Further, plaintiff is awarded two of the snowmobiles 
currently in possession of the defendant; 
b. The defendant is hereby awarded the following property currently 
in plaintiff's possession: 8-foot camper, horse trailer, coin collection, 
mirror, antique barber accessories, Avon limited edition bottles, sofa rocker, 
hide-a-bed, gun cabinet, one freezer, oak desk, adding machine, ten-man tent, 
three-man tent, propane lantern, gas camping stove, sleeping bag, 
miscellaneous camping gear, family pictures (his family), one telephone, 220 
cord, Lincoln welder, air compressor, Homelight chain saw, all but one ladder, 
wheelbarrows, scaffolding/planks, mechanic's tools and tool boxes (except for 
a variety of small hand tools to be left for plaintiff), angle grinder, disk 
sander, belt: sender, bench vice, battery charger, cement tools, masonry 
handtools, any saddles or packs or blankets not associated with either of the 
children's horses; and 19" television set; 
c. Each party is awarded the VCR and equipment currently in his or 
her possession; 
d. The parties' married son is hereby awarded the snowoobile 
trailer; 
e. The minor child, Jason, is hereby awarded all of his personal 
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property,/ the Atari game and tapes and his horse/and "all related cack and 
equipment; 
^ f. The Tiinor^chi^d, Rebekah, is hereby awarded all of her personal 
property and ^belongings,/her personal computer and her horse /ar.d all related 
tack and equipment. 
12. Each party is hereby awarded one-half of any other marical accouncs 
or stocks. 
13. Plaintiff is hereby awardec the Oldsmobile vehicle and defendant is 
hereby awarded the 3/4-ton pickup truck. Each party is ordered to execute and 
deliver all necessary documents to transfer the title to said property. 
Further, the minor child, Jascn, is awarded his 1977 Ford pick-up truck, and 
Che minor child, Rebekah, is awarded the 1958 Jeep, which title shall be held 
in the name of the plaintiff until Rebekah is of age. 
14. The minor child, Rebekah, is hereby awarded all of her share 
accounts and savings accounts and the minor child, Jason, is hereby awarded 
all of his share accounts and savings accounts. 
15. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the possession of the real property of 
the parties commonly known as 3260 South 7900 West in Magna, Utah, until such 
time as the minor child, Rebekah, attains the age^of 18 years or graduates 
from high school, whichever last occurs, or until such time as plaintiff can 
sell said real property at a price that she desires. Further, plaintiff is 
hereby ordered to pay and assume the debt and obligation owing thereon to 
Chase Manhattan Bank, commencing October 1987. 
Upon the sale of said home, it is ordered that the proceeds from the sale 
shall be divided as follows: 
a. All costs of sale and commissions shall be paid; 
b. Debt owing to Chase Manhattan to be paid in full; 
c. All outstanding medical bills incurred by the parties up until 
the date of the divorce of the parties shall be paid; 
d. Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) shall be paid to 
the plaintiff for attorney's fees and costs of litigation; 
e. One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) shall be paid to the defendant 
for attorney1s fees and costs of litigation; a?.d 
f. Any real property taxes owing on the real property shall be 
paid; 
g. Defendant shall be paid any amounts that he paid to Chase 
Manhattan Bank after October 1, 1987, to prevent foreclosure on the home and 
any sums expended to bring the homeowner's insurance current; 
h. The balance shall be divided equally between the parties, 
one-half to each. 
16. The medical debts owed to Dr. Siemens, Dr. Nielsen, A. Paige Palmer, 
Dr. Cannon and Allied Laboratories shall be paid as previously set forth. 
Further, the plaintiff is ordered to pay the debt to Chase Manhattan, as set 
forth above. Each party is ordered to pay and assume any debts and 
obligations incurred in his or her own name since the date of separation of 
the parties, said date being ttovember 21, 1986, except as set forth above. 
17. Plaintifr is hereby awarded fifty percent (50%) of all benefits 
acquired by defendant in the Kennecott and Salt Lake City Laborer's Union 
retirement plans, which is defined as 23 years of service, as well as the 
retirement at Western States Masonry, if any, accrued through June 30, 1987. 
Appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Orders shall issue assigning said 
benefits. 
The plaintiff is hereby awarded all benefits available to her under the 
United States Social Security Act as a wife of the defendant in excess of 23 
AnnFNnnM 4-6 
years. 
18* Each party is hereby ordered to pay his or her own a t torney 's fees 
and court cos t s , except as se t forth above. 
19. Both par t ies are hereby mutually res t ra ined from bothering or 
harassing the other party, e i t he r physically or verbal ly, or coming around the 
boce or place of employment of the other party for any reason whatsoever, 
except for purposes of previously arranged v i s i t a t i on . n 
20. The divorce of the pa r t i e s shall become f ina l 9^days from the date 
of entry of th i s Decree. 
DATED THIS . ^ f d a y of lll^r^ , 198S. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form and content: 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
Dist r ic t Court Judge 
Y 
5-***-
F. KIM WALPOLE 
Attorney for Defendant -TAT- - ^ ^ - cc . 
c c . - , - ,-r: S r ^ L A l > £ C C ^ T Y VTAH. DO "Z?±' 
Cr7~:.T ' 7,-VT T ^ /S^s/EC AND FCRII£Ci\3 : 
/ *v..£ Ar*C FJLu CCcr Cf A^ C 5 : G » ' . DCC*.-
K:JTT ON4 F;LE *N MY C : F , C E A I S J O S CLE5..< 
vvTj^ ESS MY H ^ C ^ ^ ^ - E ^ Of SAiD QC^T 
THIS. . CAY Cr 
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i^n njais OF J^ILiNG 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon & 
Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein; that I caused the foregoing 
proposed Decree of Divorce co be sen/ed upon defendant by placing a true and 
correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
F. KIM WALPOLE 
Attorney for Defendant 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
and depositing the same, sealed, with f i r s t - c l a s s postage pre-paid thereon, in 




KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493 
Actomey for Plaintiff 
CCRPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
i/9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JUDE NICHOLES, 
Plaintiff, INCOME AND EXPENSES OF PLAINTIFF 
-vs- Civil No. D87-89 
JAMES LEWIS NICHOLES, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
GROSS INCOME: 
Gross salary/wages $ 0 
Child support and/or aliaony $ 0 
Social security $ 0 
Disability and unemployment insurance $ 0 
Public assistance $ 0 
Dividends and interest $ 0 
Other sources S 0 
TOTAL GROSS MONTHLY INCOME $ 0 
DEDUCTIONS: 
Federal taxes $ 0 
State taxes $ 0 
FICA S 0 
annpwmiM K-I 
Other 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
NET MONTHLY INCOME 
EXPENSES: 
Mortgage payments (residence) 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities (including water, electricity and 
Telephone 






Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, 
travel, recreation) 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, 
gifts, donations, including tithing) 







































TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES /$1 ,984.78 to $2,134.78 
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§ 1 5 2 . Dependent defined 
(a) General definition.—For purposes of this subtitle, the term 
"dependent" means any of the following individuals over half of 
whose support, for the calendar year in which the taxable year of 
the taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer (or is treated 
under subsection (c) or (e) as received from the taxpayer): 
(1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of 
either, 
(2) A stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer, 
(3) A brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpay-
er, 
(4) The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of 
either, 
(5) A stepfather or stepmother of the taxpayer, 
(6) A son or daughter of a brother or sister of the taxpayer, 
(7) A brother or sister of the father or mother of the taxpay-
er, 
(8) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-
law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law of the taxpayer, or 
(9) An individual (other than an individual who at any time 
during the taxable year was the spouse, determined without 
regard to section 7703, of the taxpayer) who, for the taxable 
year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the 
home of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's house-
hold. 
(b) Rules relating to general definition.—For purposes of this 
section— 
(1) The terms "brother" and "sister" include a brother or 
sister by the halfblood. 
(2) In determining whether any of the relationships specified 
in subsection (a) or paragraph (1) of this subsection exists, a 
legally adopted child of an individual (and a child who is a 
member of an individual's household, if placed with such indi-
vidual by an authorized placement agency for legal adoption by 
such individual), or a foster child of an individual (if such child 
satisfies the requirements of subsection (a)(9) with respect to 
such individual), shall be treated as a child of such individual 
by blood. 
(3) The term "dependent" does not include any individual 
who is not a citizen or national of the United States unless such 
individual is a resident of the United States or of a country 
AOnFMHTTM £ - 1 
contiguous to the United States. The preceding sentence shall 
not exclude from the definition of "dependent" any child of the 
taxpayer legally adopted by him, if, for the taxable year of the 
taxpayer, the child has as his principal place of abode the home 
of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household, 
and if the taxpayer is a citizen or national of the United States. 
(4) A payment to a wife which is includible in the gross 
income of the wife under section 71 or 682 shall not be treated 
as a payment by her husband for the support of any dependent. 
(5) An individual is not a member of the taxpayer's house-
hold if at any time during the taxable year of the taxpayer the 
relationship between such individual and the taxpayer is in 
violation of local law. 
(c) Multiple support agreements.—For purposes of subsection 
(a), over half of the support of an individual for a calendar year 
shall be treated as received from the taxpayer if— 
(1) no one person contributed over half of such support; 
(2) over half of such support was received from persons each 
of whom, but for the fact that he did not contribute over half of 
such support, would have been entitled to claim such individual 
as a dependent for a taxable year beginning in such calendar 
year; 
(3) the taxpayer contributed over 10 percent of such support; 
and 
(4) each person described in paragraph (2) (other than the 
taxpayer) who contributed over 10 percent of such support files 
a written declaration (in such manner and form as the Secre-
tary may by regulations prescribe) that he will not claim such 
individual as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in 
such calendar year. 
(d) Special support test in case of students.—For purposes of 
subsection (a), in the case of any individual who is— 
(1) a son, stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer 
(within the meaning of this section), and 
(2) a student (within the meaning of section 151(c)(4)), 
amounts received as scholarships for study at an educational orga-
nization described in section 170(b)(l)(A)(ii) shall not be taken into 
account in determining whether such individual received more than 
half of his support from the taxpayer. 
(e) Support test in case of child of divorced parents, etc.— 
(1) Custodial parent gets exemption.—Except as otherwise 
provided in this subsection, if— 
(A) a child (as defined in section 151(c)(3)) receives over 
half of his support during the calendar year from his 
parents— 
(i) who are divorced or legally separated under a 
decree of divorce or separate maintenance, 
(ii) who are separated under a written separation 
agreement, or 
(ill) who live apart at all times during the last 6 
months of the calendar year, and 
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his 
parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, 
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as 
receiving over half of his support during the calendar year 
from the parent having custody for a greater portion of the 
calendar year (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the 
"custodial parent"). 
(2) Exception where custodial parent releases claim to ex-
emption for the year.—A child of parents described in para-
graph (1) shall be treated as having received over half of his 
support during a calendar year from the noncustodial parent 
if— 
(A) the custodial parent signs a written declaration (in 
such manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations 
prescribe) that such custodial parent will not claim such 
child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such 
calendar year, and 
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written decla-
ration to the noncustodial parent's return for the taxable 
year beginning during such calendar year. 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "noncustodial parent" 
means the parent who is not the custodial parent. 
(3) Exception for multiple-support agreement-—This sub-
section shall not apply in any case where over half of the 
support of the child is treated as having been received from a 
taxpayer under the provisions of subsection (c). 
(4) Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments.— 
(A) In general.—A child of parents described in para-
graph (1) shall be treated as having received over half his 
support during a calendar year from the noncustodial par-
ent if— 
(i) a qualified pre-1985 instrument between the par-
ents applicable to the taxable year beginning in such 
calendar year provides that the noncustodial parent 
shall be entitled to any deduction allowable under 
section 151 for such child, and 
(il) the noncustodial parent provides at least S600 for 
the support of such child during such calendar year. 
For purposes of this subparagraph, amounts expended for 
the support of a child or children shall be treated as 
received from the noncustodial parent to the extent that 
such parent provided amounts for such support. 
(B) Qualified pre-1985 instrument.—For purposes of 
this paragraph, the term "qualified pre-1985 instrument" 
means any decree of divorce or separate maintenance or 
written agreement— 
(i) which is executed before January 1, 1985, 
(ii) which on such date contains the provision de-
scribed in subparagraph (A)(i), and 
(iii) which is not modified on or after such date in a 
modification which expressly provides that this para-
graph shall not apply to such decree or agreement, 
(5) Special rule for support received from new spouse of 
parent.—For purposes of this subsection, in the case of the 
remarriage of a parent, support of a child received from the 
parent's spouse shall be treated as received from the parent. 
(6) Cross reference.— 
For provision treating child as dependent of both parents for pur-
poses of medical expense deduction, see section 213(d)(4). 
(Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, 68A Stat. 43; Aug. 9, 1955, c. 693, § 2, 69 Stat. 626; 
Sept. 2, 1958, Pub.L. 85-866, Title I, § 4(aHc), 72 Stat. 1607; Sept. 23, 1959, 
Pub.L. 86-376, § 1(a), 73 Stat. 699; Aug. 31, 1967, Pub.L. 90-78, § 1, 81 Stat. 
191; Dec. 30, 1969, Pub.L. 91-172, Title IX, § 912(a), 83 Stat. 722; Oct. 27, 
1972, Pub.L. 92-580, § 1(a), 86 Stat. 1276; Oct. 4, 1976, Pub.L. 94-455, Title 
XIX, §§ 1901(a)(24), (b)(7)(B), (8)(A), 1906(b)(13)(A), Title XXI, § 2139(a), 
90 Stat. 1767, 1794, 1834, 1932; July 18, 1984, Pub.L. 98-369, Div. A, Title 
IV, §§ 423(a), 482(b)(2), 98 Stat. 799, 848; Oct. 22, 1986, Pub.L. 99-514, 
Title I, § 104(b)(1)(B), (3), Title XIII, § 1301GX8), 100 Stat. 2104, 2105, 
2658.) 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Assess-
ment formula for temporary support. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court 
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances 
has occurred, the court, in determining the amount of prospective support, 
shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn: 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess 
all arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in 
support of spouse and children. 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective support on an ex parte or 
other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide 
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to rendering the 
support order. The formula shall provide for all relevant factors which can be 
readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the obligor's 
earnings for taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. The assess-
ment formula shall be established by the Department of Social Services and 
periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78-3-21(3). 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch. 
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amend-
ment added Subsection (4); and made minor 
changes in style. 
Cross-References. — Creation of Depart-
ment of Social Services, § 63-35-3. 
Creation of Judicial Council, Utah Const., 
Art. v m , Sec. 12; § 78-3-21. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
Public support of children, Chapter 45b of 
this title. 
